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Max Weber excluded the phenomenon of emotions from the idea of rational
bureaucracy. Modern European organizational theories are on the other hand
almost obsessed by emotions and especially affect. Emotion re-entered organi-
zational theory around the limited topic of ‘emotional labour’, but today, pas-
sion is generally praised as a driver in successful organizations. An important
element here is the demand upon passionate employees to install the organiza-
tion as their significant other. To the extent that they rely on this new concept
of themselves and their employees, organizations become dependent upon the
authenticity of the ‘self-enrolment’ expected of each employee. In the discur-
sive field of organization, we therefore see a number of new communicative
media, which centre upon emotion and upon helping the organization to attri-
bute authenticity and inauthenticity to employees. This paper also makes the
case that these media are liminal in nature and extend beyond the use of dis-
cursive symbolism in a Sisyphean effort to reach the authentic emotional
‘heart’ of each employee.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In Economy and Society, Max Weber wrote the famous
words: ‘Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the
more it is “dehumanized,” the more completely it suc-
ceeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred,
and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional ele-
ments which escape calculation. This is appraised as its
special virtue by capitalism’ (Weber, 1978, p. 975). One
corollary of this situation for modern organizations is a
feature that has been called ‘formal membership’. This
can be illustrated by something Mr Lorry says to Mr Car-
ton in Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities: ‘we men of
business, who serve a House, are not our own masters.
We have to think of the House more than ourselves’
(Dickens, 2008, p. 78). The condition of membership is
that the role of the employee (here, Mr Lorry) is decided
by the organization (the House of Telson's Bank). For this
to work, the employee must take the perspective of the
organization, and that attitude must override any ‘per-
sonal’ perspective of their own. In this context, the dra-
maturgical notion of role designates a general motive,
generalized both from the person who should fulfil the
role and from the specific situation. The ‘House’
(or organization) thus functions as what Mead (2015,
p. 154) famously called a generalized other. The role is
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decided by ‘the organization’ and in the name of the
organization, and this is done through each employee
adopting what they take to be the perspective of the orga-
nization (one must ‘think of the House more than our-
selves’). The generalization of motives afforded by this
generalized other provides insight into the impersonal
character of membership (Luhmann, 1982, pp. 75–78).
Generalized motives are not directed at a specific person,
whose job is to realize them, but is beyond the individual,
like a mask that can be worn by any qualified person. In
this way, membership also entails a zone of indifference
between organization and individual (Luhmann, 1996,
p. 341). This indifference is again neatly illustrated when
Mr Lorry explains to Mr Stryver that as ‘a man of busi-
ness, I am not justified in saying anything about this mat-
ter, for, as a man of business, I know nothing of it. But,
as an old fellow, who has carried Miss Manette in his
arms, who is the trusted friend of Miss Manette and of
her father too … I have spoken’ (Dickens, 2008, p. 139).
This zone of indifference—in which the speaker of
the role knows ‘nothing of’ that which is relevant to the
personal speaker—is double-sided: it implies (a) the orga-
nization's indifference to personal motives for being in
the organization and (b) the employee's indifference to
the organization's instructions and distribution of respon-
sibilities as long as they fall within the framework of the
general motive (Barnard, 1968, pp. 167–171). To be
granted membership implies that one has been appointed
and recognized as a person. But membership also implies
that one is assigned generalized motives, which establish
one's relevance in relation to the organizational commu-
nication. One is employed for a specific purpose. It is only
a particular part of the person who has been granted
membership, and only this part is included as relevant for
the organizational communication. The rest of the person
is granted existence, but is considered irrelevant to the
communication, and is typically given the indefinite label
‘private’ (Kieser, 1989, p. 547). Thus, the decision of mem-
bership perpetuates a principle of inclusion by exclusion:
one belongs on condition that—in one's capacity as an
employee—one publically disowns one's private desires
and feelings and speaks instead through the mask. One is
only relevant to the communication, and therefore
included, through reference to the generalized motive.
Everything else is excluded until further decisions are
made. Formal membership, which became constitutive
for modern organization, thus defines membership by
clearly distinguishing role and person and by enrolling
only those aspects of the person deemed relevant to the
enactment of the role (as a unity of role and person).
Today, this very radical exclusion of feelings and pri-
vate personal issues by formal memberships is somehow
challenged. For some time, the need for passion has been
articulated in management handbooks and HRM policy
papers. One may even speak of a discursive regime of
intimized management (Andersen, 2013; Andersen &
Born, 2007, 2008; Bauman, 2008). An example of this
articulation is the book Passion at Work from 1998, writ-
ten by marketing professional Kevin Thomson. His basic
assumption is that ‘one of the strongest emotions of all is
passion. It is a motivator which drives us to incredible
limits’ (Thomson, 1998a, p. 3). For Thomson (1998a), pas-
sion is the single most important quality in an employee:
‘When the passion is gone, people either quit from believ-
ing in their job and go, or even worse, they ‘quit’ and stay.
We're left with people with no enthusiasm or excitement
for what they do’ (p. 4). Richard Chang's (2001) book The
Passion plan at Work is in line with this idea and argues
that ‘passion is the single most powerful competitive
advantage an organization can claim in building its suc-
cess’ (p. 5). Shaul Fox and Yair Amichai-Hamburger
define a more practical set of questions. As they say, the
challenge is: ‘How to tap the emotional components of
human behavior?’ (Fox & Amichai-Hamburger, 2001,
p. 87).
The implication of this is that the organization as gen-
eralized other must somehow shed its generality in order
to recapture something of the particular quality of a sig-
nificant other. This, as will be touched upon later when
discussing feminist contributions to the literature, can be
viewed as a certain becoming mother or becoming lover of
the old austerely patriarchal ‘House’ described by Dick-
ens. The feature noted earlier by which the employee
must take the perspective of the organization remains
constant, but the quality of that perspective goes through
a transformation. Both the organization and its members
together undergo a discursive intimization that is also
captured by the term ‘emotionalization’ (Greco &
Stenner, 2008). This emotionalization is also reflected in
a growth of academic interest in emotions and organiza-
tions, including the establishment of new journals
(Domagalski, 1999; Fineman, 2005), and Greco and Ste-
nner (2008, pp. 1–21) show this to be a trend that has
occurred across all significant social systems and associ-
ated academic disciplines. The early phase of this trend
was received rather critically within organization studies
via the ‘emotional labour’ approach (Hochschild, 1983),
before mainstreaming into the form illustrated by the
examples quoted above. In more recent critical organiza-
tion studies, a number of effects of this discursive
intimization of work relations have been discussed. Bet-
ina Rennison has shown how the question of pay is
framed as reciprocity of love. It pays off to show initiative
and engagement (Rennison, 2007). Asmund Born and
Niels Å. Andersen analyse the history of the public
employee and show how formal membership is partly
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transformed into a membership of self-enrolment coded
in the media of passion and installing the organization as
the significant other. In the media of passion, the
employee is expected to continually strive to make herself
loved by the organization by anticipating the organiza-
tion's needs. Love becomes a managerial regime
(Andersen & Born, 2007, 2008; Andersen, 2013). In a
quite different type of study, Arlie Hochschild (2004) ana-
lyses the work–life balance technology ‘Family 360’ and
shows how management performance today includes
measures of relationships to the manager's parents,
spouse, children and close friends (see also Lewis &
Simpson, 2007). Susanne Ekman (2013) discusses how
task-specific concerns in interactions between managers
and employees have been replaced by relational intensity
where managers and employees try to seduce each other.
Anders Bojesen and Sara Louise Muhr (2008) have
investigated how passion at work might lead to a kind of
overinclusion where the employees ‘end up experiencing
the love that the organization shows transformed into a
unifying act of assimilation—wanting to own you; absorb
you, direct you to its needs—all in the name of love’
(pp. 84–85). André Spicer and Carl Cederström (2010)
formulate it in psychoanalytical terms: ‘Figures who are
completely subsumed and passionately attached to an
organizational love object can prove to be a serious risk
for the organization. This is because they see no bound-
aries to the love relationship and will frequently engage
in excessive behavior that disturbs the smooth function-
ing of the organizational machine’ (p. 161). And also the
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman is aware of some of the
effects of the intimization of work. He writes: ‘The job is
never finished, just as the stipulations of love and recog-
nition are never met completely and unconditionally.
There is no time, successes tend to be forgotten a
moment after being scored. Life in a company is an infi-
nite succession of emergencies …. This is an exciting and
exhausting life; Exciting for the adventurous, exhausting
for the weak-hearted’ (Bauman, 2008, p. 130).
The question is: What is this new organizational culti-
vation of feelings and emotions an answer to? To answer
this question, it is necessary to structure our paper into
two parts:
First, as essential theoretical preparation, we discuss
more fully the change in the form of membership alluded
to above as a move from formal membership to member-
ship by self-enrolment (this draws upon Andersen, 2013,
pp. 38–106 & Andersen & Pors, 2016, pp. 149–181). In the
first form of membership, expectations of the organiza-
tion are secured by the distinction between role and per-
son, which is drawn within a communicational medium
characterized by means–ends rationality. The distinction
between role and person secures organizational
expectations by assuming a stable set of organizational
objectives and by leaving the private individual ‘outside’
the role. The employee, we might say, derives their
authority from the organizational objectives demonstra-
bly embodied in their formal role. Indeed, in this form,
the private person, complete with their emotions, is
observed to be a source of instability or noise (stereotypi-
cally associated with all things feminine, working class,
foreign, childish, ethnic, gay, etc.). If the private ‘person’
side of the distinction ‘intrudes’ into the role side, this
undermines authority. In the second form, the person is
expected to enrol herself and to do so recurrently within
an organizational context framed as ever-changing. Here,
emotions acquire a new value as a source of motivation,
responsiveness and vitality and so can no longer be
excluded via the conventional role/person distinction. In
this context, the distinction between role and person can-
not secure (ever-changing) expectations, and this is com-
pensated for by what we call the authenticity of the self-
enrolment, that is, the enlistment of certain aspects of
‘the person’ that are excluded within formal membership.
In an important sense, it is a misnomer to refer to self-
enrolment as a new ‘form’ of membership, since strictly,
it is an informalization (perhaps a de-formation but cer-
tainly a transformation) of formal membership. The clear
conceptual distinction between role and person is
blurred, and with this, blurring comes a mobile indi-
stinction between personal feelings and work duties that
can be described as liminal. Arising in response to this
‘puncturing’ of the formal zone of indifference, the new
emphasis on authenticity can be understood as compen-
sating for the authority that is inevitably lost through this
transformation. As will be explored later, this shift consti-
tutes a qualitative change in the communicative medium
of meaning, a change that gives new value to forms of
symbolic communication associated not with the
employee as a formal and hence rational subject, but as
an emotionally authentic vital subject (Stenner, 2017b).
This is expressed both in a transformed conception of the
organization—which mutates from ‘generalized other’
into ‘significant other’—and of the ‘self’ of the
employee—who must recognize herself through the gaze
of the organization as passionate, self-governing, change
embracing and playful. Both must now display that they
operate within a mobile zone of intensive engagement.
Second, we will show the emergence of new media of
symbolic communication, which are suited to these dis-
plays of authentic and vital subjectivity. Based on a
semantic analysis of the recent literature on emotions in
organizations, we identify how this growing semantic on
the organizational cultivation of feelings and emotions
can be differentiated into four distinguishable but closely
related media of transition. Appropriate to the premise of
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permanent change highlighted above, we call these
‘media of transition’ because each is characterized by a
concern with and for transition. Each in its own way is
also preoccupied with managing the problem of authen-
ticity, which arises along with the shift to self-enrolment
under premises of permanent change. The four semantics
identified in our analysis are (1) romantic media of tran-
sition (which facilitate the relational transformations
entailed by a concern with love and passion), (2) peda-
gogic media of transition (which facilitate personal devel-
opment and the emotional issues that this raises),
(3) therapeutic media of transition (which facilitate
movement beyond ‘stuck’ existential circumstances, and
the emotional fears and phobias these entail) and (4) ludic
media of transition (which encourage change through
playfulness and the emotions of joy and excitement asso-
ciated with play).
Finally, in our conclusion, we offer some theoretical
reflections on these findings and point to the value of
considering these semantics as liminal media of transi-
tion. Management of liminality is demanding and leads
towards a trembling organization haunted by the incom-
municability of authenticity.
2 | FROM FORMAL MEMBERSHIP
TO MEMBERSHIP OF SELF-
ENROLMENT
Many have pointed to the fact that change towards more
change has become a discursive imperative in modern
organizations since the 1980s. The temporality has
evolved from change on a background of stability to a
temporality where ‘constant change’ is seen as the only
stable background (Andersen, 2013, pp. 27–38). It is this
new regime of temporality that challenges organizational
membership to shift from formal membership to mem-
bership by self-enrolment. This shift is carefully studied
by Niels Å. Andersen focusing on the semantic history of
the public employee in Denmark from 1860 until today
(Andersen & Born, 2001; Andersen, 2013, pp. 38–106;
(Andersen & Pors, 2016, pp. 149–181; Andersen & Pors,
2014; Andersen & Born, 2007, 2008; Andersen, 2007). It is
a temporality of perpetual emergence.
Furthermore, under conditions described as change
on a background of stability, the organization functions
as a motor of stability against which ‘private’ motives
show up as relatively variable and unpredictable. Formal
membership secures stability of expectations by assigning
stable generalized motives to each member, and these
motives establish the member's relevance for the organi-
zational communication. In short, the organization is the
author of the script defining the member's role
(Luhmann, 1996; Andersen, 2013, pp. 40–44). This does
not mean that role and person are fully independent.
They of course influence one another. On the one side,
the person who is taking the role might give it a personal
touch, for example, being a teacher known for a particu-
lar style, while on the other, the role might end up col-
ouring the personality; for example, we can recognize the
doctor role in the person by her habit of always having
ready answers. Naturally, there is also always an informal
side to formal membership, and generalized motives have
probably always been strategically particularized. Dick-
ens (2008), for example, describes a certain Monseigneur
as having ‘the truly noble idea of general public business,
which was, to let everything go on in its own way; of par-
ticular public business, Monseigneur had the other truly
noble idea that it must all go his way—tend to his own
power and pocket. Of his pleasures, general and particu-
lar’ (p. 101).
The point of formal membership is not that private
desires do not exist but that communicative effort is
made to draw a boundary that recurrently creates this
category of feelings and includes them only on the ‘pri-
vate’ side of the constructed divide, as a ‘personal’ face
concealed by the mask of office. It is on this semantic
basis that an ideal of public rationality, symbolizing sta-
bility, comes to set up contrasts with privatized emotions,
symbolizing forms of instability. Historically speaking,
such forms of ‘emotional’ instability have been typically
and prejudicially associated with women, children, gays
and indeed practically all those categories of humanity
perceived to fail to reach the standards of the ‘Victorian’
white bourgeois male. Mr Stryver, for example, quickly
explains to Mr Lorry that he ‘cannot control the mincing
vanities and giddiness of empty-headed girls; you must
not expect to do it, or you will always be disappointed’
(Dickens, 2008, p. 141). What matters is that through for-
mal membership, with its distinction between role and
person, such disappointed expectations can be avoided. If
the role establishes and secures more stable expectations,
then the organization need not concern itself with the
changeable private motives of persons and need ‘say no
more about it’ (p. 141).
The notion of ‘permanent change’ challenges the dis-
tinction between role and person that constitutes formal
membership. When the organization becomes defined by
its ability to constantly be something other than what it
is, everything in the organization gets cast in this light. It
is no longer sufficient for the membership to slowly adapt
over time because defined memberships pose an obstacle
to change. Even though memberships can be changed
over time, changing them still requires a decision. Sud-
denly, what was once the function of formal member-
ship, that is, to serve as the memory of who is member
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and on what premises, is now seen as dysfunctional. In
times perceived as ever-changing, formal membership
decreases the organization's ability to preserve itself by
means of change.
Instead, a need develops for a form of membership
that can keep changing and that can ‘go with’ and moti-
vate change, rather than resist it. One solution here is
membership of self-enrolment (Andersen, 2013, pp. 46–48;
Andersen & Pors, 2016, p. 154). This membership estab-
lishes a paradox and contains an inherent state of unrest
that prompts a process of discovery in organizations.
Basically, this form of membership says, ‘We decide to
grant you membership on condition that you constantly
enroll yourself and define and redefine the conditions of
this membership’. In effect, this means that membership
is contingent on the member agreeing to write and
rewrite the script of their own role.
Giving organizational authorship to members as a
condition of membership requires them to draw upon
aspects of themselves that were excluded as private under
the regime of formal membership, and this in turn
requires the organization to take the new form we have
described. The membership of self-enrolment copies and
re-enters into itself the formal membership distinction
between ‘role’ and ‘person’ on role side of the difference.
That means, on one hand, that the difference between
generalized motive and person is maintained. On the
other hand, however, the generalized motive becomes
personalized. The generalized motive is now defined as a
responsibility for personal self-motivation, and this is
part of the same process by which the generalized other
is transformed into a more personalized ‘significant
other’. In other words, the generalized motive is now
defining an expectation that the person who is intro-
duced into the organization will independently define the
generalized motive binding the individual as if the motive
were motivated by the organization. The general motive
is transformed into a demand for a particular articulation
by the individual member and fitted to the immediate sit-
uation. At the same time, the individual member com-
mits to justifying the particular articulation using the
organization's motive as a point of reference. The person
is expected to be personally motivated to motivate herself
as if her motivation were that of the organization. The
member must still take the perspective of the organiza-
tion, but now, that attitude has changed.
Many questions might be raised here, but we are con-
cerned with one question: How do you qualify for a
membership of self-enrolment? How does the organiza-
tion distinguish between satisfying and not satisfying
self-enrolment? These problems were of minor relevance
to formal membership, but a problem of true and authen-
tic self-enrolment emerges as soon as the ‘personal’ is no
longer excluded as a private matter about which the orga-
nization must show indifference. That question becomes
urgent because the difference between being and not
being a member of an organization gets left to each
employee's own self-enrolment, and this is a matter that
has hitherto exceeded the purview of the organization.
This creates a fundamental insecurity in organizations
regarding the authenticity of the employee's own self-
enrolment. Is she truthful now? Does she mean what she
says? Is this a case of genuine engagement? I can see that
she is making an effort to work with commitment and
engagement, but does she really understand what we are
doing here? And the employee is asking similar ques-
tions: Am I really happy being here? Is it the work I love
or is it my colleagues? Can I be the one I want to be when
I am in this organization and in this job? Therefore, am I
genuine and authentic in my own membership?
The loss of expectation security that accompanies the
fall or transformation of the difference role/person needs
somehow to be compensated for. Because it now becomes
the responsibility of the single employee to constantly
(re)enrol herself and to motivate herself in the image of
the organization, the security of expectation can only be
established by ‘the source’ of enrolment. The organiza-
tion comes to depend on this ‘core’ of authentic interest
that each employee must show in the organization. What
is required in this ‘transient’ context is some means for
the organization to observe and manage the emotions of
its employees. We will argue in Section 4 that this chal-
lenge of observing and managing emotions is being met
by the use of a host of new semantic media that we call
liminal media of transition. Each of these media is spe-
cialized in generating, observing and managing emotions
(and affectivity more generally), and, before they featured
in work settings, each had its source in contexts of psy-
chosocial transition or becoming. First, however, it is nec-
essary in the next section to present some findings in
which we identify these media as semantics within the
discourse of those who study and write about
organizations.
3 | ROMANTIC, PEDAGOGIC,
THERAPEUTIC AND LUDIC
SEMANTICS
The material in this section comes from an analysis of a
rather heterogeneous mix of texts published since 1990
including consultancy books and other prescriptive litera-
ture on organization and emotion. Based on a reiterated
process of (re)reading and (re)coding, an analytical
decomposition of these books resulted in the identifica-
tion of four distinguishable discursive themes of
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relevance to our topic. As explicated in full below, each
theme implies a distinct semantic grid of intelligibility
through which the issue of emotions within organiza-
tions shows up in a distinctive manner. We do not claim
that no additional themes exist beyond the corpus of
books we analysed (an exhaustive analysis was beyond
the scope of this project), but we are confident that the
themes identified below serve well to characterize the lit-
erature we analysed. It will of course be of interest to
identify further variants in future research. For a more
extensive introduction to this type of discourse analysis,
which is grounded in Niklas Luhmann's concept of
semantics, see Andersen (2003) and Andersen (2011).
Here, it is important to avoid a possible confusion. A
main guiding difference in Luhmann's work is
semantic/structure. In this distinction, structure marks
the differentiation of society (hence, one might say that a
society that is functionally differentiated has a different
structure to one that is hierarchically differentiated).
These societal structures are not in themselves observ-
able. They are only observable through the semantic his-
tory representing a kind of trace of past communication.
Here, by contrast, we are using another difference that is
also present in Luhmann's work, but in this second dif-
ference, semantic is identified with structure and not dif-
ferentiated from it. Namely, we observe with help of the
difference communication/semantic and in this frame
semantic is structure representing the stock of repeatable
forms of meaning and communication is operations con-
stantly vanishing as they emerge. This difference might
not be developed to the same extent by Luhmann, but it
is anyway implied in the difference semantic/structure.
Social systems are recursive networks of communi-
cative operations. As operations, the communicative ele-
ments are things that occur and then perish, giving rise
in turn to the next communication. From this perspec-
tive, the problem becomes that of how any order or
form or structure is possible at all such that one event
might connect with another to permit the repetitions
needed to compose a system. It is in this theoretical
context that the concept of structure as semantics takes
on new significance. Where communicative operations
constantly form meaning, meaning can, over time,
develop into condensed meaning. Communication is
thus able to develop structure, which condenses mean-
ing into already actualized forms that are disconnected
from the immediate situation of actuality. Condensation
is the process of movement from potential to actual
whereby a multiplicity of potential meaning is captured
into a single form, which—once actualized—becomes
available to another (as yet unspecified) communication.
Semantics is defined, therefore, as the stock of general-
ized forms of differences (e.g. concepts, ideas, images, and
symbols), which can be used in the selection of meaning
within the communication systems (Luhmann, 1993,
pp. 9–72).
Below, we discuss four ‘semantics’ that were distin-
guishable in our data set, each a relatively coherent
‘stock’ of meaningful concepts, ideas, images and sym-
bols. Without going into the technicalities here, different
analytical traditions would call these ‘discourses’ or
‘themes’ or ‘narratives’ (Andersen, 2003; Stenner, 1993).
3.1 | The passionate employee: A
romantic semantic
The first semantic about the relation between member-
ship and emotions is the semantic of the passionate
employee. This semantic articulates and constitutes a
problem of authenticity but does not solve it.
An example of this semantic, introduced earlier, is the
book Passion at Work from 1998, written by marketing
professional Kevin Thomson whose basic assumption is
that ‘one of the strongest emotions of all is PASSION. It is
a motivator which drives us to incredible limits’
(Thomson, 1998a, p. 3). For Thomson (1998a), passion is
the single most important quality in an employee because
‘Our emotions are what drive us and our organizations to
incredible feats. Let them loose!’ (p. 6). And Thom-
son (1998b) links this to a particular trend in the new
spirit of capitalism: ‘Capitalism as we know it would be
better described as “emotional capitalism.” (…) The bot-
tom line: emotional capital is the stuff of dreams. It is
energy, drive and commitment invested and held in the
hearts of everyone connected with business’ (p. 13).
Essentially, Thomson argues that the basic criterion of
being member as an employee of an organization is pas-
sion and involvement in the organization. In this seman-
tic, the real organization is observed as emotional
relations, and the formal organization becomes the coun-
ter concept to the real: ‘It is the hearts and minds of
everyone in that company that creates its personality’
(Thomson, 1998b, p. 22). Here, the organization does not
exist outside the emotional relations that constitute
it. Passion basically becomes the substance of an organi-
zational ontology. It becomes crucial for an organization
to create itself as the significant other of its employees
(and customers): ‘In today's society employees are no lon-
ger willing to be part of a rigid, unfeeling bureaucracy.
People want to work in organizations they like, and are
like them’ (Thomson, 1998b, p. 25). Through this lens, it
is important that not only employees but also the organi-
zations are attributed emotions: ‘Companies are living
entities with emotions just below’ (Thomson, 1998b,
p. 23).
STENNER AND ANDERSEN 455
Often, of course, the phrase ‘the organization’ is taken
to mean ‘management’ as distinct from the ‘labour force’,
as Fox and Amichai-Hamburger (2001) suggest: ‘The
Organization must also see itself as having a warm, open
relationship between its management and employees’
(p. 88). In representing the character of the organization,
and hence its expectations, management must engage the
positive emotions of its employees. The challenge is:
‘How to tap the emotional components of human behav-
ior?’ (Fox & Amichai-Hamburger, 2001, p. 87).
Dennis K. Mumby and Linda Putnam articulate a
very similar semantic of the passionate employee in sev-
eral articles from the beginning of the 1990s, though writ-
ing from the perspective of feminist management critique
rather than marketing. In this account, the old formal
(Dickensian/Weberian) counter-concept, which serves as
‘other’ to their ‘caring’ organization, is further developed
as having hierarchical features expressive of patriarchy,
and the organization of the future is observed to be a
heterarchy rather than a hierarchy. Heterarchy is seen as
a fluid social order in which goals and values are flexible
and unpredictability is a fundamental condition. There
can be no fixed roles that members can assume. They
must therefore take responsibility and care for one
another: ‘Nested in an environment of caring, members
balance the demands of differing values, goals, and rela-
tionships to make the group a place where all members
feel comfortable and achieve their individual aims’
(Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p. 475). Here, the employee is
required to work based on a desire to connect and to
develop relations. Rigid descriptions of different profes-
sions do not work in such an organization: ‘The needs of
the person or the relational context would guide feeling
rules, rather than the occupational identity’ (Mumby &
Putnam, 1992, p. 477).
Here, again, the membership criterion becomes par-
ticular feelings and emotions rather the formal compe-
tencies. Putnam and Mumby (1993) call this demanded
feeling ‘work feeling’: ‘Work feelings ( …) contribute to
the building of community by forming a bond of interre-
latedness’ (p. 52). Work feelings are seen as the product
of a dialogical process in which employees are mutually
responsive: ‘These work feelings are spontaneous and
emergent; they are not directed to particular instrumental
goals, but rather are outgrowths of relationships and
interpretive schemes. (…) they encourage interrelatedness
and mutual understanding. (…) They aid in “bounding”
emotions because a person uses these emotions to recog-
nize the other person's subjectivity and to promote
responsiveness to others. (…) Employees form a dialogical
relationship’ (Mumby & Putnam, 1992, pp. 477–78). So
work feelings are perceived to be the authentic expres-
sion of the employee's real feelings and identity. In this
way, the old cold and authoritarian ‘generalized other’
familiar to Dickens and Weber is replaced by a warm and
loving female significant other that is attuned in a caring
manner to the situational specificities and cultural con-
tingencies of relational nurturance, and it is the attitude
of this significant other that employees are invited to
adopt in coordinating their working lives.
But how is the passionate, caring organization able
to draw a difference between authentic passions and
work feelings on the one side and non-authentic expres-
sions on the other side? In the semantic of both Thom-
son and Mumby and Putnam, it is crucial. Everything
in the organization seems to depend on passionate
employees. But when an employee says: ‘I am so glad to
be here. I really love this place and my work’, how can
managers or colleagues know whether this expresses
true feelings or just expresses that the employee knows
what his manager wants to hear? So this semantic of
the passionate employee constitutes a significant prob-
lem of authenticity, which did not exist in the formal
bureaucracy, where the membership criterion simply
was to fulfil the formal role. Within the semantic of pas-
sion, there are at least three techniques for proving
authenticity.
The first technique we might call ‘the proof of the
opposite’: authentic expression must not be a mere play
act or game or some other instrument of deception or
alienation. Mumby and Putnam especially articulate this.
Authentic work feelings are here distinguished from
‘emotional labour’, which involves emotions that by defi-
nition are false (see Hochschild, 1979). Emotional labour
‘refers to the way individuals change or manage emo-
tions to make them appropriate or consistent with a situ-
ation, a role, or an expected organizational behavior’
(Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p. 472). Emotional labour
refers to those aspects of care or service work, which pre-
scribe specific emotional behaviour and expression in
employees, for example, smiling or speaking in a soft
voice. Here, emotions serve ‘instrumental goals and task
functions’ (Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p. 472). In this con-
text, they quote the following statement from Ferguson:
‘Like prostitutes, flight attendants often estrange them-
selves from their work as a defense against being
swallowed by it, only to suffer from a sense of being
false, mechanical, no longer an integrated self’ (Mumby
& Putnam, 1992, p. 472). So when the managers hear an
employee saying ‘I am so engaged. I just love my work’,
then this statement is considered inauthentic if it can be
attributed to roles or instrumental goals or functions in
the organization. If we are not able to attribute the state-
ments to the roles and instrumental goals, then we
might attribute them to the employee as an authentic
person. This contrast, of course, does not fully solve the
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problem of proving authentic passion but can perhaps
cover it up for a while.
The second technique is to turn the difference
between true passion/not true passion into a continuum.
Richard Chang (2001) tries in his book The Passion Plan
at Work to solve the authenticity problem by developing
what he refers to as a ‘Passion Scale’ where organizations
can test themselves and their employees and find out if
they score high or low on passion on scales like the fol-
lowing (p. 5):
 ‘malaise’ – ‘ambivalence’ – ‘interest’ – ‘enthusiasm’.
Or alternatively:
 ‘Disgruntlement’ – ‘frustration’ – ‘encouragement’ –
‘excitement’.
In a variation of this technique, Kevin Thomson fol-
lows biblical tradition and distinguishes between ‘deadly’
and ‘dynamic’ emotions, identifying 10 of each. His regis-
ter of dynamic emotions includes things like obsession,
commitment, delight, love and trust, and these are con-
trasted with deadly emotions such as fear, apathy, anxi-
ety, envy and hatred (Thomson, 1998b, pp. 23–24).
Again, these techniques can at best cover up the problem
of authentic passion, and at worst, they multiply it since
now we must distinguish not only true passion from false
but also ‘low’ from ‘high’ passion and ‘deadly’ from
‘dynamic’ passion, since each member of these categories
can also be more or less authentic.
The third technique is ‘to listen’. Shaul Fox and Yair
Amichai-Hamburger argue that the management must
actively ‘recognize’ employee emotions. This is a way to
make sure that passion is expected and welcomed.
Authentic emotions become more likely when the orga-
nization creates a space for listening in a loving manner:
‘Listening to people's hopes and dreams, encouraging
them to express their fears and doubts, and enabling
them to present their visions of the future of the organi-
zation may lead them to feel that management is atten-
tive to their concerns and respectful of their feelings’
(Fox & Amichai-Hamburger, 2001, p. 90). Once again,
while this approach might increase the likelihood of
‘authenticity’, it can by no means serve as a final test.
Indeed, it risks redoubling the problem in a different
way: now, it becomes necessary also to establish if the
manager is in fact authentically interested in listening to
the employees' feelings.
The passion semantics articulate emotion in relation
to the question of authentic self-enrolment. The
employee's relationship with the organization must
spring from within as authentic engagement. Thus, in
this semantics, the organization comes to rely entirely on
their employees' authentic feelings for the organization.
The sought-after engagement is not supposed to be exter-
nal, instrumental and commodified but spontaneous,
relational and expressive of the self-identity of the indi-
vidual employee. The organization wants to be loved for
what it is, and this makes it dependent upon the authen-
tic engagement of its employees. The implicit and explicit
expressions of emotion become signs of either the
absence or presence of engagement, which is why it
becomes so important for employees to be given the
opportunity to express their true feelings. Management
becomes a continual appeal to emotion, the creation of
possibility for engagement, and the recognition of
employee emotion.
3.2 | Learning to take responsibility for
one's emotions: A pedagogic semantic
The second semantic about the relation between mem-
bership and emotions is the semantic of sentimental edu-
cation (with reference to Flaubert's famous novel (2010
[1857]). This semantic inherits the problem of authentic
passion and engagement and proposes a solution where
the single employee takes responsibility for his emotional
expression. As Montgomery (1985) articulates in relation
to employees: ‘Begin to accept and assume ownership for
your anger’ (p. 22). As we shall see, this approach also
quickly finds itself caught up in paradoxes of
authenticity.
Daniel Goleman who became a major name within
this field believes that the modern organization must
strive to constitute a partnership among employees and
between management and employees. He shares with the
semantic of the passionate employee the ideal of an orga-
nization kept together by emotional commitment
(Goleman, 1998, p. 119). He refers to the organization as
‘the organizational marriage’ and the relationship
between manager and employees as ‘the vertical couple’
(Goleman, 1998, pp. 212–13). In this way, Goleman starts
by acknowledging the emotionalization of both sides of
the organization (i.e., the emotionalized employee who
takes the attitude of what we have called the organization
as ‘significant other’). This enables him to argue that, as
in every marriage, ‘If both do well emotionally—if they
form a relationship of trust and rapport, understanding
and inspired effort—their performance will shine. But if
things go emotionally awry, the relationship can become
a nightmare and their performance a series of minor and
major disasters’ (Goleman, 1998, p. 213).
But Goleman does not simply demand true passion
and engagement from the employee. His approach is
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educational: ‘The good news is that emotional intelli-
gence can be learned’ (Goleman, 1998, p. 315). The aim is
to support positive emotions through the building of
emotional competences in managers and employees. This
involves a difference between emotion as cultural and
feelings as individual. Feelings become separated from
their social manifestation, and the social manifestation
cannot simply be seen to represent feelings authentically.
This distinction makes it possible to view emotions as
something that can be acquired and cultivated. Elena
Antonacopoulou and Yiannis Gabriel (2001) have elabo-
rated on this difference and their perspective is that
employees need to learn positive emotions, which then
support organizational change: ‘Learning about one's
emotions provides a useful starting point for recognising
what causes these emotions and how they may be
worked on, reconciled with and corrected’ (p. 445).
Learning about emotionality liberates employees so
that they are no longer victims of their feelings. They go
on to argue that ‘learning, at its highest, has a liberation
quality, defeating ignorance, fear and superstition,
unleashing potential and developing new ideas and out-
looks. It can stimulate emotions of hope, love and soli-
darity as well as desire for a better order’
(Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001, p. 445). Or as
Goleman (1998) frames it: ‘At the individual level, ele-
ments of emotional intelligence can be identified,
assessed, and upgraded (…) Emotional intelligence refers
to the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those
of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emo-
tions well in ourselves and in our relationships’ (pp. 315,
317). Thus, the basic assumption is that the authentic
expression of one's feelings does not necessarily effect
hope, love and solidarity. Knowing about emotionality
and its effects creates better conditions for passion and
engagement. They argue that managers of organizational
change typically focus on negative feelings such as oppo-
sition and fear but that organizational change can be bet-
ter supported by teaching employees positive emotions.
The basic premise is that if emotions are educated,
then this will do away with the problem of distinguishing
authentic passion by turning it into a matter of staff
development. The semantics of sentimental education
contain a notion of a self, capable of splitting itself first
into feelings (internal operations) and emotions (external
expressions) and then into desirable and undesirable
emotions. One has to learn to assume responsibility for
the effects of one's emotional expressions. Positive feel-
ings will likely follow positive emotions (for a Foucault-
ian analysis of the discourse on emotional intelligence,
see Hughes, 2010, and for a critique of positive psychol-
ogy, see Greco & Stenner, 2013). This semantic does not
supply an answer to how to be authentic and honest and
how to distinguish honesty and dishonesty in someone
else. In fact, it complicates the question of authenticity by
constructing emotions as anyway a public matter whose
effects must be controlled regardless of their relationship
to internal feelings. Its solution seems to be training in
how to manage and manipulate emotions as an organiza-
tion medium, and from there, feelings too are expected to
fall into place. It seems clear that a developed proficiency
with operating a ‘language of emotions’ on the part of
employees will not in itself solve the problem of authen-
ticity. Indeed, from one angle, this shows up as training
for professional dishonesty.
3.3 | When pain is considered more
authentic than passion: A therapeutic
semantic
The third semantic about the relation between member-
ship and emotions is the semantic of care focusing on
pain. This therapeutic semantics relates to the negative
emotions that are produced in organizations as the side
effect of passionate work.
Peter Frost contributes to this development. His
starting point is the passionate organization in which
self-enrolment is codified in a highly intimate way: ‘And
as people are increasingly invested in their work rather
than in their personal lives or communities, organiza-
tions more and more become the stages where people's
hopes and expectations play out. Indeed, the modern
work organization has become a zone where life is
increasingly lived for full meaning—encompassing the
full spectrum of human emotions and experiences’
(Frost, 2003, p. 102). Given this expansion of life invest-
ment in the work place, the organization is under an
obligation to care for the pain that can arise when
employees invest themselves fully. This is not mere altru-
ism, since Frost (2003) sees the emotional pain of
employees and managers as a form of toxification of the
organization: ‘We live in times where there is much pain
and suffering in and around organizations. There is much
to be learned about toxicity in organizations and how
best to handle it’ (p. 226). Frost writes himself up against
Goleman like this: ‘While Goleman's early work, at least,
focuses on positive effects of high emotional intelligence,
what became most salient to me (…) was that contagion
could be positive or negative, and the emotions experi-
enced by one person might also be absorbed by the per-
son who attempts to help’ (p. 4).
The individual employee can become toxic and thus
become a toxin for the organization: ‘Over time, a single
employee can do any or all of these kinds of things, fos-
tering a workplace that is unhappy indeed, because
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employees who are uncivil are toxic’ (…) ‘Toxicity is pro-
duced when an individual's attitude or an organization's
policies, or both, fail to take into account the emotional
attachment people have to their contributions to work’
(Frost, 2003, pp. 51, 56). The solution to the growing tox-
icity problem is the compassionate organization,
equipped with specialist ‘toxin handlers’: ‘The compas-
sionate organization: - sees a clear link between the emo-
tional health of employees and the organization's bottom
line - recognizes and rewards mangers who are good
toxin handlers - hires for attitude as well as technical skill
- maintains a fair-minded workplace, recognizing the
direct connection between consistent values such as loy-
alty, responsibility, and initiative, and the health of the
organization overall - has intervention strategies in place
for times of distress or change (…). - Build a company cul-
ture that values compassion and community as beneficial
to productivity and to people’ (Frost, 2003, p. 28).
Compassion represents the central form of care: ‘We
identify compassion as comprised of three interrelated
elements: noticing another's suffering, feeling empathy
for the other's pain, and responding to the suffering in
some way’ (Frost, Dutton, Maitlis, Lilius, &
Worline, 2006, p. 846). Compassion is seen as interper-
sonal work, which includes listening and the creation of
a space for pain. Furthermore, it is not just management
that needs to listen. Rather, management is responsible
for helping employees listen to one another: ‘Pain in
organizations can often be overlooked or misinterpreted
unless the listener actively engages empathically and
commits to listen for emotions in the message that those
in pain allow themselves to send’ (Frost et al., 2006,
p. 850).
Compassion is the central concern of toxin handlers:
‘The work of toxin handlers is about responding compas-
sionately to pain in their organization in order to either
minimize or prevent it, identify it, contain it, remove it,
or find ways for people to live with it constructively’
(Frost, 2003, p. 62). Frost (2003)asserts that a toxin han-
dler is responsible for ‘listening, holding space for
healing, buffering pain extricating others from painful sit-
uations, transforming pain’ (p. 63). Listening to pain also
means to create human bonds within the organization:
‘Listening with compassion to someone else's pain, pro-
viding a moment of human connection’ (Frost, 2003,
p. 63). As a listener, the toxin handler also becomes a
pain manager who provides the ‘attention that allows the
person in pain to feel heard, respected, and helped’
(Frost, 2003, p. 66).
This notion of listening as the management of toxins
creates a particular variation of the question of
inclusion/exclusion. When the toxin handler listens to
the toxic and pained employee, the employee is
considered emotionally excluded, perhaps self-excluded.
Painful emotions signify that the employee does not feel
appreciated and respected. Listening does not simply lead
to inclusion but rather to the organization's ability to con-
tain the excluded. The organization needs to be able to
contain pain. This produces a re-entry of the distinction
inclusion/exclusion so the excluded becomes included as
excluded. So while the pain-stricken employee has not
successfully self-enrolled, the effort on the part of the
organization to ‘contain’ the pain indicates a recognition
of the troubled enrolment effort. The one who does not
feel loved is recognized, and her love pains observed, and
she thus becomes included in a compassionate collective.
Toxin handlers/pain managers need to be able to read
and anticipate the other's emotions: ‘She can visualize
and feel the anger, fear, or demoralization that deroga-
tory statements or actions would trigger if they were
directed at people personally. The handler is often partic-
ularly quick at recognizing such situations and stepping
in to serve as a buffer’ (Frost, 2003, p. 71). Compassion
can help those in pain reconnect with their work and rec-
reate their sense of worth. Compassion might even trans-
form the individual's self-relation: compassionate acts
‘can help transform people's sense of themselves, change
the way they relate to their colleagues, and shape the
way they view their organizations’ (Frost et al., 2006,
p. 850). The inclusion of the excluded, in short, can lead
to the employee's self-inclusion.
However, this work with toxins is not without its dan-
gers. Toxin handlers can be infected by the pain they see
and allow it to overwhelm them (Frost, 2003, p. 90): ‘The
people who handle the emotional pain of others might
themselves be vulnerable to that very same pain. In
effect, handling emotional toxins can be as hazardous as
working with physical toxins’ (Frost, 2003, p. 4). Again,
we see the metaphor of contagion, which indicates that
the individual's pain is relevant to the organization. Feel-
ings of pain cannot be isolated. Therefore, toxin handlers
have to be treated with compassion themselves, not least
because toxin handlers can be affected by the suffering
because they come to depend upon the emotions gener-
ated through the work of toxin: ‘Handlers for their part,
bring some of this suffering on themselves. They get care-
less about their own well-being. They pay more attention
to others than to themselves. They become consumed
with worry about whether they are doing the right thing.
They become addicted to the “fix” that helping other peo-
ple can deliver’ (Frost, 2003, p. 105). Ultimately, a toxin
handler can become a toxic employee and a toxin for the
organization: ‘Handlers of toxins can become so infected
with other's pain that they, in a real sense, become
“toxic” themselves, and begin inflicting pain on others’
(Frost, 2003, p. 8).
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Authenticity becomes an important question but not
in the same way as in the semantics of passion. It is not a
question of finding proof of love. In fact, misrecognized
or troubled engagement is observed as more likely, and
indeed more authentic than ‘true engagement’. What is
articulated here is a question of listening to what cannot
be heard. The toxin handler is assigned the role of listen-
ing to the suffering of employees, allowing space for this
suffering, feeling the pain of employees and showing it
through compassion. The task of the toxin handler is
therefore to ‘listen for emotions in the message’, that is,
to hear non-communicated emotions and pain. Not only
this, the toxin handler must communicate the emotions
of non-communicated emotion back to the employee so
that the employee feels listened to, respected and helped.
This is so even though, or perhaps especially when, they
have not explicitly asked for help and indeed may have
offered something more like toxic frustration or even
aggression. Communicating one's listening constitutes
the compassionate and detoxifying act. But this challenge
of communicating the non-communicable doubles the
problem of authenticity, particularly when the empathy
of the toxin handler is itself inherently questionable,
prone as it is to inhabitation by inauthentic motives to be
perceived as a ‘saviour’. What if the pain manager were
calling out pain even where it did not previously exist?
What if the alleged toxins, spreading throughout the
organization, were the projection of a toxin handler
whose mode of operation is always to expect toxicity espe-
cially where it does not appear to exist because it is
expressed otherwise.
This semantics, in short, generates organizational
expectations about pain. The perspective of pain expects
pain. Pain becomes the flipside of emotional engagement.
Pain does not constitute engagement but bears witness to
it, that is, as rejected or misrecognized engagement.
Thus, in a strange way, pain is assigned value. Pain
becomes a sign of authenticity, which stands in for love.
And which is perhaps considered more authentic and
direct than more explicit love declarations.
3.4 | The emotional meanings of play: A
ludic semantic
The fourth semantic about the relation between member-
ship and emotions is the semantic of play. We see a ludic
semantics about emotions, which suggests that emotion
is something we should play with.
An organizational semantics of play has developed
during the last two decades or so, and its focus is on the
relationship between play and emotion. In this seman-
tics, the problem of authenticity becomes ubiquitous and
relates to the notion of total dedication. In 2000, Pat
Kane, who wrote the 2005 book about the ethics of play,
writes: ‘So to call yourself a ‘player’, rather than a
‘worker’, is to immediately widen your conception of
who you are and what you might be capable of doing. It
is to dedicate yourself to realising your full human poten-
tial; to be active, not passive’. We see a vitalist idea about
emotional self-realization through a playful approach to
the world. If one is seriously playing, playful feelings are
not only required in specific instances of play, but at all
times as a general approach, a worldview, which should
apply everywhere. According to Kane (2000), to call one-
self a player implies being constantly playing and dedi-
cated to play: ‘Play as the exercise of human freedom and
self-fulfillment, from birth to death’.
Leslie Yerke's book, Fun Work, presents a somewhat
less radical perspective although the demand for dedica-
tion and authenticity is the same. The preface reads:
‘Fun-loving, passionate people are just going to make bet-
ter leaders than nonsense, unenthusiastic types who have
no place for a bit of foolishness in their lives’
(Yerkes, 2007, p. xi). Yerkes (2007)goes on to say: ‘True
fun is not something you choose to do, it is something
you choose to be’ (p. 11). There is no possible exteriority
in a playful approach to work since to be playful is a
mode of being something one IS. Playing allows the indi-
vidual to become identical with itself; it abolishes every
split in the self and creates wholeness: ‘To bring your full,
fun self to your work relationships, remove the layers of
grudges and betrayals that insulate your heart. When
your heart joins your head and hands in work, you will
have released one of the most powerful forces in your
life—the energy of your whole being’ (Yerkes, 2007,
p. 43). ‘Fun is losing your self in the work’ (Yerkes, 2007,
p. 224).
Accordingly, play becomes the form that fulfils the
passionate membership and solves love's problem of
authenticity: ‘The best conduit to our heart is fun. Fun
makes work enjoyable, it makes us love what we
do. Fun connects to love through the heart. When we
enjoy what we do, we say we love our job. When our
job is a “labor of love,” it's less work and more fun.
The more our work is fun, the more we love our
work. (...) Be authentic. Bring your heart’
(Yerkes, 2007, p. 175). Fun eliminates the doubt that
relates to passion. Whereas passion always creates
uncertainty about whether I am loved for who I am
and whether I love the other for who they are and
therefore creates doubt as to the authenticity of expres-
sions such as ‘I love you’, Yerkes' (2007) claim is that
play demands authenticity without creating such
doubts: ‘Authenticity cannot be learned, it cannot be
faked’ (p. 109). Yerkes quotes a midlevel manager:
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‘Fun is having passion for your work and linking up
with your colleagues’ (p. 142). Yerkes also talks about
loving management: ‘Offer love and encouragement.
The more you give the more you get. Make it your pri-
ority to support; seek out those who need it’ (p. 218).
Moreover, authenticity is defined not only in terms of
the social dimension but also in terms of the temporal
dimension. Authenticity is perceived as pure presence in
the now: ‘Capitalize on the spontaneous. (…) Fun doesn't
happen according to schedule. It isn't something we plan.
Fun grows in a culture that fosters its existence; it springs
automatically from the proper environment. Don't inhibit
its existence by scheduling too tight; allow room for it to
breathe and grow’ (Yerkes, 2007, p. 45). Fun is spontane-
ous, but at the same time, the argument is that fun per-
forms: ‘We suffer from the lack of integration of fun and
work’ (Yerkes, 2007, p. xiii). ‘Work needs fun’
(Yerkes, 2007, p. 5). ‘We are beginning to discover that
fun belongs with work. It is my premise that fun and
work naturally go together. That fun works and work
pays off better when it is fun (…) When fun is integrated
with work instead of segmented from work, the resultant
fusion creates energy; it cements relationships between
co-workers and between workers and company. When
fun is integrated into work, it fosters creativity and
results in improved performance’ (Yerkes, 2007, p. 8).
This creates a strange paradoxical figure, which subjects
itself to the demand for performativity and thus directs
itself purposefully towards the future while insisting that
performance is enhanced through absolute presence, that
is, by disregarding and suspending future performance
demands.
Certain emotions, however, function as a threat to
play. Feelings of stress are considered a threat to play and
authenticity: ‘Stress is the enemy. It reduces your capac-
ity for engaging your fun self’ (Yerkes, 2007, p. 28). Fear
is another emotion, which is seen as a threat to play:
‘Fear and fun are opposite ends of a continuum. Fear
comes from low trust; fun comes from high trust. When
we have high trust, we have fun; when we have fun,
there is high trust. (…) Fear is often the thing that stands
between us and what we want most. Fear creates a reac-
tion that makes our desire elusive. What we want most is
coated with our own fear. (…) To have trust, you have to
believe in the future and have fun in the present’
(Yerkes, 2007, p. 75). It is important to note that stress
and fear are emotions that point to a dependency upon
an environment.
Loyds Sandelands (2010) formulates a particular rela-
tionship between organizational change, love and play:
‘Change in organizations is best taken in the spirit of love
that is play. As change calls to love, the greatest changes
call to the greatest love of the divine in which all things
are possible’ (p. 71). This means that change is contingent
upon certain emotions: ‘Play is the form that love takes
at the boundary between fantasy and reality where new
social arrangements arise to take the place of old social
arrangements (…) play is to know not by analysis via
mind and reason, but by intuition via body and feeling’
(p. 72). Feelings for play become constitutive for organi-
zational change, and this perspective draws in particular
on Csikszentmihalyi's concept of flow: ‘Flow denotes the
holistic sensation present when we act with total involve-
ment. It is the kind of feeling after which one nostalgi-
cally says “that was fun,” or “that was enjoyable.”’
(Csikszentmihalyi in Sandelands, 2010, p. 74). The feeling
of total engagement is thus emphasized as that which
creates play.
In total engagement, the self is abolished and merges
with the collective (which is why play is seen as the most
profound and authentic form of love). Sandelands (2010)
speaks of ‘selflessness’: ‘In play, the boundaries that usu-
ally isolate one person from another—the identities that
distinguish them as individuals—are overcome by the life
of community’ (p. 76). Play is simply founded on love:
‘Born of love, play is the second moment of social life. It
is love's bloom of creation at the boundary of
unseriousness (fantasy) and seriousness (reality)’
(Sandelands, 2010, p. 77). Furthermore, play's feeling of
total engagement is seen as equivalent with feelings of
being human and fully alive: ‘In play we come to com-
munity fully human and fully alive’ (Sandelands, 2010,
p. 78). Sandelands continues his chain of equivalencies
and speaks of ‘the feelings of play’ as the feeling of ‘being
in it with others’, ‘feeling of growth’, ‘feeling of rhythm’
and about ‘feeling of undergoing, of movement on the
way to an unknown and undecided resolution’ (p. 79).
He sums up play as ‘a feeling of social life’ and points out
that ‘although the feelings are felt in person, they are not
personal’ (Sandelands, 2010, p. 79). Thus, feelings relate
not only to the psychic system but also to the social. Play
becomes the identification of the feeling of ‘the deepest
vitality of human community’ (Sandelands, 2010, p. 81)
and thus also effects ‘the deepest and most lasting
change’ (Sandelands, 2010, p. 82). This is truly a radical
figure of authenticity since it insists on the simultaneous
identity with oneself and with the significant other. The
individual has become one with the social.
Thus, in addition to a semantics of love, pedagogy
and care that relate to emotions, we also see a semantics
of play about emotions. Like the semantics of love, this
semantics centres around the question of authenticity.
However, as we have seen, it too is threatened by the
spectre of emotions like fear, anger and anxiety, which
militate against a generalized playful mindset, threaten-
ing to tip it over into something less enjoyable, like a
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fairground ride, which spins out of control and turns into
a real disaster. It seems that these negative affects at the
edge of play (especially the ‘serious play’ that is valorized
in this semantic) can never quite be eliminated from
playful situations, which perhaps function precisely to
flirt with them. Furthermore, the radicality of the play
semantics centres on its association with situations of
transformation in which, as we have seen, ‘new social
arrangements arise to take the place of old social arrange-
ments’. Such situations of becoming are not just inher-
ently ambivalent in an emotional sense (Greco &
Stenner, 2017); they are also prone to manipulation by
those who have concrete interests in the outcome. Simply
affirming the value of play does not resolve the problem
of authenticity but, again, redoubles its significance (see
Stenner, 2017b).
4 | THEORETICAL DISCUSSION:
ROMANTIC, PEDAGOGIC,
THERAPEUTIC AND LUDIC
SEMANTICS AS LIMINAL MEDIA OF
TRANSITION
We began our article with the concept of formal member-
ship arguing that the ideal of constant change and trans-
formation challenged formal membership forcing it to
evolve into self-enrolment. Formal membership is the
unity of role and person, defining everything personal as
organizationally irrelevant. Chester Barnard and Niklas
Luhmann talk about a zone of indifference implying both
the organization's indifference to personal motives for
being in the organization, as well as the individual's
indifference to the organization's instructions and distri-
bution of responsibilities as long as they fall within the
framework of the general motive (Barnard, 1968;
Luhmann, 2018, pp. 82–83, 232). The zone of indifference
helps to transform the excluded problem of personal
authenticity into a formal problem of authorization. An
employee can talk with authority as long as she refers to
the generalized motive (the role) decided by the organiza-
tion. The four semantics we have analysed above show
no sign of such a zone of indifference. Instead, we might
talk about a zone of intense investment in which the
employees and the managers mutually try to prove their
authentic engagement in work and organization
(Andersen, 2013, pp. 48, 171).
This shift is profound. Authority and authenticity are
almost antagonistic concepts. Authority can be proved
and tested. It concerns representation based on formal
concepts. The employee has authority when her actions
demonstrably reflect the role. The organization can
observe whether the employee's action represents the role
or not. Authenticity, in whatever form it takes
(Stenner, 1999) might be performed but cannot be repre-
sented and so is incommunicable. It is a ‘virtue’ that
operates, as it were, below the level of the speech act
(Williams, 1971). In order for a self to represent herself,
she must draw a distinction and therefore split herself,
being both herself, and not herself. Authenticity is basi-
cally a paradox (Langraf, 2002, p. 160). Since membership
by self-enrolment nevertheless demands proof of authen-
ticity, this creates a particular puzzle: What communica-
tive medium is appropriate for being shaped into the
form of intense personal investment?
We have shown how the ‘emotionalization’ of organi-
zations is associated with a shift in organizational mem-
bership, and that the issues of authenticity raised by this
shift are being articulated in relation to semantics of love,
education, therapy and play. We have thus distinguished
four media of communication that have emerged in con-
temporary organizations as means for communicating
these new forms of intense personal investment and vital
subjectivity. We have opted to call these romantic, peda-
gogic, therapeutic and ludic media of transition. Why
‘media of transition’?
We use the word ‘media’ because each of these
semantics serves as medium for the forms proper to the
new conditions of membership by self-enrolment. They
are, in other words, the means by which people involved
in organizations can talk about and work upon the
authenticity of their feelings in a work context. In this
sense, they are distinct from the communicational
medium proper to formal membership, which we showed
to be a discursive medium characterized by means–ends
rationality.
We use the word ‘transition’ for two main reasons.
First, because the shift from formal membership to mem-
bership by self-enrolment has taken place under condi-
tions characterized by a new premise of permanent
change as distinct from change on a background of stabil-
ity. Under these paradoxical new conditions of perma-
nent liminality (Szakolczai, 2017), organizations have
come to value and expect flexibility, innovation and open-
ness to possibility. Second, because the semantics of love,
education, therapy and play that we have identified in
our analysis have each been derived from a source
domain that is directly associated with liminal transi-
tions, before being newly applied in the work domain.
First, the romantic medium of transition has its source in
relationship transformations entailed by a concern with
love and passion. Second, the pedagogic medium has its
source in the education of children and hence in practices
that facilitate personal developmental transitions, along
with the emotional issues these raise. Third, the thera-
peutic medium has its source in those practices that
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facilitate movement beyond ‘stuck’ existential circum-
stances, and the emotional fears and phobias these entail.
Finally, the ludic medium of transition has its source in
spontaneous playfulness and the games that build upon
this, both of which have long been associated with onto-
genetic transformations and cultural rites of passage (and
evoke the emotions of joy and excitement associated with
play). In sum, before they featured in work settings, each
medium had its source in contexts of psychosocial transi-
tion or becoming. For this reason, the four media of tran-
sition share in common a clear concern with transitional
phenomena combined with a concern with the affectivity
that is inevitably associated with transition (Stenner,
2017a). These are the transitions involved in new rela-
tionships, in new learning, in situations of life difficulty,
rupture and transformation, and in ontogenetic develop-
ment and ritual. Together, when adapted and applied
with the new domain of organizations, they comprise a
communicative medium appropriate for being shaped
into the form of intense personal investment that is
required under conditions of membership by self-
enrolment.
Our final theoretical contribution is the suggestion
that as liminal media of transition, these organizational
semantics are special in at least two other ways: (1) As
semantic structures they are anti-structural, resisting any
fixed general other, and (2) as a stock of generalized
forms, they are loaded more with symbols than with con-
cepts. Both pose challenges for organizational
communication.
4.1 | Antistructure
!?A3B2 twb=.29w?>At the start of Section 3, we articu-
lated Luhmann's concept of semantics and showed how
semantics are the form that structure takes within social
systems: meaning is condensed into a form that lends
coherence and predictability to communication.
Returning to the four semantic media of transition, it is
striking that they have a quite different relation to struc-
ture. Elsewhere, we have argued that semantics do not
always and only function structurally to enhance the
expectability—and hence ‘connectability’—of communi-
cation (Andersen & Stenner, 2020). Sometimes, the
expectation structures facilitated by the historical sedi-
mentation of semantics can prove counter-productive to
social systems. In situations of transition, for example, it
becomes necessary to suspend and perhaps even decon-
struct expectations that have become redundant and
counterproductive. In such circumstances, semantics are
required that can operate in a manner that is not just
structural but antistructural or ‘antiform’
(Luhmann, 2000, p. 34). It becomes necessary to suspend
or disrupt ordinary expectations, to challenge outdated
meanings and assumptions and to create new possibilities
for meaningful connection. This is indeed the case in
self-enrolment. As a form of membership, self-enrolment
is not simply a new form but a fold or a re-entry of formal
membership, where enrolling yourself essentially consists
in resisting any temptation to accept a predefined role.
Self-enrolment involves a continuous work of suspending
formal roles while always being open to new needs of the
organization as significant other. Here, transition has
become a permanent state.
4.2 | Symbols
The second special characteristic also relates to
Luhmann's definition of semantics as the available stock
of generalized forms of differences. He is open to the idea
that meaning need not be solely conceptual (and hence
representational) but can be condensed into a variety of
forms such as images and symbols, which are certainly
meaningful, but not necessarily in the representational
sense discussed above. For the most part, however, the
focus in Luhmann's (1993) semantic analysis is in fact
upon the condensation of meaning into concepts. A con-
cept, put succinctly, is a unity of the difference between
concept and counter-concept (Andersen, 2011). It is a
condensation and generalization of a multiplicity of
meanings and expectations, which can in turn be contra-
sted with a counter concept.
Compared with more stable situations, circumstances
of liminal transition tend to be loaded with presenta-
tional symbols (often embedded in rituals) and are often
less conducive to standard conceptual discursive
thought. This is because they entail experiences of
becoming in which those involved have, as it were, left
behind one relatively clear universe of discourse but
have yet to acquire the conceptual framework of the
new world still in process of emergence (Stenner, 2017a,
pp. 151–195). It is hard to ‘represent’ when that which is
to be represented has yet to clearly emerge, and such cir-
cumstances precisely call for new forms of sensemaking.
Our family of four semantics are indeed well described
as stocks of symbols and rituals rather than of concepts.
These media are rich with non-conceptual, non-
representational forms of presentational symbolism
(Stenner, 2017a, pp. 76–80), including ritual, art, theatre
and games (Stenner, 2017b), and these in turn are tightly
connected with questions of affect and emotion. Where
concepts stress a difference and a distance between signi-
fier and signified, symbols, in the sense we are using
them here (following Luhmann, 2000), stress unity.
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Symbols, in this usage, are a very different form of con-
densed meaning than concepts. We see a dominance of
such symbols in early modern semantics, and not least
in religion (Luhmann, 2013, p. 245). In the middle ages,
symbols were not just signifying but offered access to
something otherwise inaccessible. Symbols were, so to
say, unities of the visible and the invisible, the present
and the absent, and not only do they signify these uni-
ties, they also perform them (Luhmann, 2012, p. 141). As
Luhmann (2000) writes: ‘The symbol marks the inacces-
sible within the realm of the accessible; we are therefore
dealing with a form of reentry of a distinction into what
it distinguishes. The symbol contains a reference to its
own origin, which grounds the representation in its
“given” form’ (p. 169).
We have argued that the key problem faced in the
emotionalized organization is the problem of the ‘inac-
cessibility’ of the authenticity of self-enrolment. This
problem refers ultimately to a fundamental gap between
communication and consciousness. Only communication
can communicate. Consciousness cannot communicate
itself ‘because every communication is always already
autopoietic components of a social system’
(Luhmann, 2001, p. 21). Organizations need some kind of
proof of self-enrolment and its authenticity, and the effect
is a problem of incommunicability that cannot be solved
by concepts. Symbolization might here be seen as a func-
tional equivalent to concepts in situations of obvious
incommunicability. In this way, we might understand
why the romantic, pedagogic, therapeutic or ludic media
of transition are loaded with emotionally salient symbols.
They are forms of meaning that promise a kind of bridge
to link what can be represented within discursive com-
munication to what cannot. Some of these symbols (and
indeed the affectivity associated with them) might even
promise a kind of symbiotic function regarding the rela-
tion between communication and consciousness
(Luhmann, 1998, p. 27, Stenner, 2004).
‘Play’, to give an example from our analysis, is a pre-
sentational symbol more than a representational concept.
Play symbolizes authenticity. It does not simply represent
authenticity but invokes it. Play as a symbol does not
communicate about authenticity. It is a communication
that avoids communication claiming to give immediate
access to what it symbolizes (i.e., it is ‘presentational’).
Play claims to coproduce authentic playfulness, obviating
the need to test authenticity. If Morten is playing, then of
course, he is authentic. But there is a paradox here
because, by the same token, play is at odds with the idea
of authenticity since to be play it must ongoingly distin-
guish itself from ‘the real thing’, and hence is always
open to being identified as inauthentic ‘mere’ play, lac-
king true commitment. Similarly, declarations of love by
employees to the organization as their significant other
provide another example of a semantic that is more sym-
bolic than conceptual. The symbols present or perform
the love relation, making it more than indicating
it. Employees declaring their engagement, taking initia-
tives, showing involvement make use of this symbolic
semantic in a manner that does away with the problem
of authentic self-enrolment. And yet at the same time,
just like romantic love, one is always left wondering if
this is ‘the real thing’, and paradox once again looms. As
Landgraf (2002) writes about romantic love communica-
tion: ‘Tears, speechlessness, fainting or, in writing, excla-
mation marks, ellipses, and hyphens come to
communicate incommunicability. Unfortunately, all the
communicative strategies are also open to imitation and
simulation. Communicative speechlessness quickly
becomes another commonplace, another rhetorical strat-
egy that cannot guarantee authenticity and inwardness’
(p. 171).
This symbolic semantic, in sum, offers only a partial
resolution to the problem of incommunicable authentic-
ity that is simultaneously ‘antistructural’ since it can
always be questioned, withdrawn and doubted, and—like
Sisyphus with his rolling stone—must be recurrently and
endlessly re-enacted in a flexible manner. In this sense,
each medium of transition can be grasped as a means for
the management of liminality (Stenner & Moreno, 2013;
Greco & Stenner, 2017), including the management of
the new forms of uncertainty and emotional volatility
that come with membership by self-enrolment and its
insoluble problem of authenticity. The semantic move-
ment from concepts to symbols can be observed as an
attempt to deal flexibly with the problem of authenticity.
But this movement does not solve the problems but
pushes them around, ultimately contributing to the con-
struction of a trembling organization (Andersen, 2013,
p. 160), which grows increasingly uncertain because what
is most important to it is that which is not—and cannot
be—communicated.
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